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sifies under the following heads: 1. Motor type, including the natural motor type and the artificial motor type, *le type moteur forcé*. 2. The central type. 3. The indifferent type. 4. The sensorial type, subdivided into visual-motor (*visuomoteur*) and kinæsthetic-motor (*kinésomoteur*).

The term central attention is adopted from Dr. Martius, who employed it in regard to complicated reactions to designate the case where the thought, instead of acting exclusively upon the idea of the sensorial signal or that of the responsive movements, concentrates itself chiefly upon the associative connection of the signal with the corresponding movement. The observations on which the author has based his classification consist of a series of individual studies, for which he states the quantitative results, attaching, however, even greater weight to the introspective reports of each subject, which form a marked feature of the work and include a minute and careful account of the bodily signs of the different kinds of attention and inner speech (*langage interieur*). This introspective study gives to the work a freshness and interest usually lacking in studies of reaction times.

THEODATE L. SMITH.

*Kritische Psychiatrie.* Von DR. MAX HERZ. Wien, 1895, pp. 124.

Dr. Herz gives us here some "Kantian wien in the disturbances and misuse of the pure speculative reason." He would make the doctrine of the pure reason useful for psychiatry. Since Kant, as Schopenhauer remarks, recognized the human mind as a machine, took it to pieces and showed, to speak popularly, how the wheels go round, there have been countless volumes written in the same spirit upon the same subject, but this "*ineinander greifendes Räderwerk*" has always been considered as working normally. Dr. Herz tries to show how the machine works *abnormally*, disease being, as Krafft-Ebing remarks, only function under abnormal conditions. Hence the name, the Critical Psychiatry. Accordingly Meynert is termed the Locke of psycho-pathology, because of his Kantian philosophical tendencies. The work deals largely with an exposition of the *Kritik d. r. Vernunft* and with the application of psychiatric cases to fit and illustrate it. He treats of the disturbances of general logic, of the "*Erkenntnisvermögen*," of apperception, of concepts, and of the ideas (pathological cosmology and pathological theology).

The author shows much acuteness and learning, but, nevertheless, the work appears to bear no fruit. Psychology has grown since Kant died, and Dr. Herz's *psychology* is too full of Kant's *Erkenntnistheorie*, "faculties," separate mental water-tight compartments, "*ruhende Ich*" and other wreckage to make it an advance in present psychology or psychiatry.

ARTHUR ALLIN.

*Die Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins und der Glaube an Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit. Systematische Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie.* Von DR. GÜNTHER THIELE, Berlin, 1895, pp. 510.

This large volume on the philosophy of religion from a German professorial chair in Königsberg does not propose to treat religion from the standpoint of anthropology, psychology or the historical development of culture, but proposes to justify epistemologically and philosophically, the religious belief in God, freedom and immortality. The need of such is all the greater, since, according to the author, it has come to such a pass that the ordinary lay-

man rejects a theological proposition for no other reason than that it stands in the Bible or rests upon Bible authority. Hence this new attempt to justify the ways of God to men.

According to the author, the one great truth and highest concept in the philosophy of religion is personality. "Only man as person is free and responsible, only personal immortality has ethical worth, only a personal God offers full satisfaction to religious and moral needs. The real kernel of the concept of personality is self-consciousness. Hence the justification of the name of this philosophy of religion, the Philosophy of Self-consciousness." Knowledge, or *Wissen*, is used here in a narrower and in a wider sense. "In the narrower sense it denotes the quiet, certain possession of a truth; in the wider sense, that peculiar psychical light which not only in thought, but also in will and desire, sensation and feeling permeates with light more or less clearly our psychical life and specifically distinguishes it from mere dead being." This element of "psychical light" common to thought, will and feeling, thus makes possible "*die dem Seelenleben charakteristische Innerlichkeit, sein In-sich-, Bei-sich-, Für-sich-sein.*" Now the knowledge of knowledge (*Wissen des Wissens*) is easy after this, and one is not surprised to find Plotinus placed as acme of the ancients and cream of the Greek philosophy in this respect. The author, then, in this spirit, guides one through the Kantian categories and endeavors to show how Kant in his cosmological and other proofs gets hopelessly entangled and involved in self-contradictions. The *regressus in infinitum* of the causal chain of world actions ought not to impose on us; "we believe rather that we must set up a dam against it, and that dam is the concept of the unconditioned, the *causa sui*, the Absolute Substance." (The "must" is instructive.) The "soul-substance" of man is said to be supertemporal, simple, continuous, etc.; the ego is the identity of knowing and willing and substantial being. At the same time it said "Hume is right; through mere self-observation we find neither an *ego*, nor an *activity* of the ego, only a coming and going and association of presentations and at most of feeling and impulsive tendencies." How this is reconcilable with the author's Philosophy of *Self-consciousness* is difficult to understand. A German professor was once asked by a student to explain an obscure portion of his own book. The professor looked perplexed and replied, "There was a time when two persons understood this passage, *der liebe Gott* and myself; *jetzt weiss es nur der liebe Gott!*" In my opinion, we have here a similar case. The author then proceeds to make "*das Setzen, Hin-meinen des Ansichseins*" or self-consciousness a category, and with the aid of Kant, Fichte, Herbart and his own "psychical light" makes out his case more or less. "The supertemporal ego as spaceless-intensive can only stand to the brain in a spaceless-dynamic relation." The usual theological doctrines *re* freedom and immortality are developed in the latter part of the volume.

The good "professor of Königsberg" has, as in duty bound, written his book; whether it will appeal in any shape or form to the modern psychologist may be questioned. Here is what the professor says of reflex action: "The last ground or reason for the transformation of a sensory into a motor impulse is the circumstance that in the state of feeling following the sensory impulse there is already contained an acceptance or rejection of this condition, that is, an impulse (*Trieb*) which produces a motor process, a reaction of the soul upon the organism!"

ARTHUR ALLIN.